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1 Abstract
In this paper, we explore various technologies and their roles in subverting
the privacy infrastructure of the Internet. We also provide mitigation techniques
on the attack vectors the technologies provide, and assess the overall severity of
these threats.
2 Introduction
Over the last two decades, advances in privacy-enhancing technologies, in-
cluding cryptographic mechanisms, standardized security protocols, and infras-
tructure, significantly improved the privacy of users. Cryptographic primitives
are now commonly used in the development of applications, where protocols
such as TLS/SSL are widely used to secure web access, VPN tunnels, and wire-
less networks (e.g., WPA-Enterprise). In the last decade, Tor, a byproduct
of those primitives, emerged as a practical solution to protecting the privacy
of citizens against censorship and tracking. At the same time, Tor’s success
encouraged illegal activities, including sophisticated botnets, ransomware, and
a marketplace for drugs and contraband. These botnets have proved increas-
ingly adaptable and resistant to various countermeasures that researchers have
constructed. One kind of botnet, called OnionBots, leverages the Tor network
directly to infect hosts. In Section 3, we will go into more detail about a botnet.
Section 4 will delve deeper into the specifics of Tor. With this information, in
Section 5, we will explore OnionBots and how they work. We also discuss the
threat severity and mitigation tactics for each of these sections. Finally, we
touch upon
3 Botnets Strengthening Capabilities
A botnet is a plurality of Internet computers that have been set up to for-
ward transmissions to other computers on the Internet. A computer part of
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a botnet may or may not be aware of the fact that it is obeying the com-
mands given by a central computer, called the master. This master, who issues
commands called Command and Control messages, rallies all the computers
to accomplish a task, most often for a destructive purpose. This can include
sending spam, instigating click-fraud, launching distributed denial-of-service at-
tacks, and spreading malicious software such as adware, spyware, worms, and
viruses. [7] Botnets can have different variants - centralized, peer-to-peer, and
hybrid. Having a centralized server initiating all the attacks results in faster
convergence and propagation and is easier to maintain and monitor. However,
it also has a single point of failure - If the command server is compromised,
the entire botnet is incapacitated. Botnets operate most efficiently when undis-
covered, so attackers organizing botnets are constantly searching for new ways
to evade detection. This is why Tor is so attractive for botnets, which we will
discuss later on. Some ways to avoid detection without using Tor include using
Fast flux and Domain Name Generation. In Fast flux, a botnet maps many IP
addresses to a single domain name. It then rapidly registers and deregisters
these domain names with the various IPs through changing the DNS A Record,
making it tough to detect the actual source of the attack. In Domain Name
Generation, new domain names are created for the botnet nodes to use so that
they can contact their master.
To mitigate botnets, we have to detect the nodes themselves. [2] [4] Once
found, we can hijack and shut down their command and control servers [6]
through a number of different methods. Some include reverse engineering the
algorithm used for the Domain Name Generation stated above, and block ac-
cess to the domains before they can do heavy damage. We can also inspect the
network traffic and identify the key features of Command and Control commu-
nication. This can be done through machine learning to detect flow sizes and
client access patterns [11].
On the other hand, the increasing use of Tor by botnets can effectively hide
the botnet nodes, making it extremely hard to detect, hijack and shut down.
The severity of botnets as a threat to users has remained consistent throughout
its inception. Indeed, there are many companies whose entire business model
relies on helping companies protect themselves from botnet attacks. Research in
this area has also garnered a significant amount of attention. However, attackers
are constantly evolving as well, coming up with new ways to circumvent server
patches and various other techniques for combating botnets. As we’ll see with
Tor and OnionBots, the anonymous nature of the nodes creates a whole new
playing field for botnets in network security.
4 Tor, An Anonymity Network
Tor is a distributed, low-latency anonymity network where clients estab-
lish anonymous communication by relaying traffic through intermediary nodes.
These intermediary nodes, called onion routers, are Tor relays that pass on the
encrypted information from source to destination. The client will package its
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data and send it to these relays together with symmetric key negotiation to
form a circuit. This relay is called the introduction point, which is randomly
chosen. It encrypts its message in layers so that each relay can unwrap the top
layer with its private key, and pass on the information to the next layer. This
repeats until we reach the rendezvous point, which then forwards the data to
the intended server.
Tor is excellent at maintaining the anonymous identity of the sender. Each
relay only knows where it should send the data next, so it’s impossible to back-
track its chain of relays to the original sender. As a result, this identity protec-
tion creates a very effective medium for illegal activity. Tor allows users to host
Internet servers without revealing their location, which has resulted in technolo-
gies such as Silk Road [1], Zeus botnet [9], and the hosting of the Cryptolocker
Ransomware’s C&C server. [3]
Tor itself does not pose a threat to security protocols, as it is just a medium
to distributing anonymous information. That being said, the implications of
anonymity-focused communication makes it a very potent platform for antag-
onistic software to be built upon. Botnets can now communicate via Tor and
make it extremely difficult to be discovered and torn down, as we will see in
the next section. With its increasing popularity, Tor will cause internet security
headaches for years to come.
5 OnionBot, A Botnet Utilizing Tor
OnionBot is a peer-to-peer botnet that relies on Tor for its communication
with each other [10]. Because it decouples its operation from the infected host’s
IP address, the traffic that is carried does not leak information about the source,
destination and message. In addition, no bot knows the IP of any other bot.
To communicate, it only knows a few temporary onion addresses of the bots
that it can send a message to next. Therefore, tracking the bot chain is nearly
impossible. Through Tor relays, the master can control any bot at any time
without revealing its identity.
OnionBot operates in 4 stages. The first, infection, is the phase where un-
knowing users are infected through phishing spam, remote exploiting, drive-by
download, zero-day vulnerability, etc. Once a computer is infected, it enters the
rally stage, where it will look for other bots in the Tor network. To do this. It
bootstraps into the network through a hardcoded peer list of onion addresses,
which is periodically updated. After connecting to the OnionBot network, the
infected computer enters the waiting stage, where it is ready to receive com-
mands from the botmaster through push-based transmissions. Finally, after
receiving a command and a target, it enters the execution phase, where it sends
out spam or makes requests repeatedly, such as a Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attack. [5]
OnionBot may seem impossible to take down due to its leveraging of Tor;
however, we can cleverly mitigate it using a process called SOAP [8]. In SOAP,
we first find a bot’s onion address by detecting it through reverse engineering
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an infected host, or using honeypots. Once the onion address is found, we set
up clone bots that peer with this host. Eventually, with enough sybils, we can
dominate the neighbors of the bot and partition it out of the botnet. Doing this
repeatedly for the OnionBot will eventually neutralize it.
There is no threat of OnionBot at the moment, as it is just a conceptual
design implemented in paper of Sanatinia et al. However, there is a very real
chance that Tor-based botnets will look sometime like the OnionBot in the
future, which would be very tough to mitigate in a timely manner. As more
botnet implementers are turning towards monetizing their systems, e.g. botnet-
as-a-service, the motivation for creating an effective botnet is higher than ever.
6 Broken Cryptographic Mechanisms
Although the increasing use of privacy-enhancing systems by antagonistic
software makes the antagonistic programs hard to detect, the primary concern
with the ever-increasing sophistication of such malicious systems does not only
lie with its potential to distribute malware on end hosts, but also its power to
subvert and exploit existing cryptographic mechanisms that many applications
utilize each day.
Aside from the typical Internet traffic, it is important to remember that es-
sentially all existing data, such as those needed by anti-virus systems, make use
of these cryptographic mechanisms to securely deliver the latest malware signa-
tures in order to operate properly. Without the proper malware signatures, the
majority of anti-virus systems would not be able to detect subsequent intrusions
by the botnets. In such a serious case, even firewalls would be rendered useless.
Once the next wave of botnets successfully exploit the cryptographic mecha-
nisms, not only would it be a privacy concern, but general network security
would also be a devastating problem.
7 Conclusion
While cryptographic mechanisms and standardized security protocols have
come a long way to detect and defend against eavesdroppers using a variety of
encryption techniques and key-exchangemethods, and Tor that further enhances
privacy, malicious systems that couple botnets with Tor, like OnionBot, can lead
to serious security concerns. Especially with users already using Tor to enhance
their privacy, OnionBot, which operates within Tor, can have the potential to
easily infect the connected Tor users. Users who utilize Tor for private communi-
cations could one day have their privacy eroded without noticing. Furthermore,
these antagonistic programs, more sophisticated and hard to detect than ever,
can launch malware that subvert the privacy of many Internet-connected users
before users even have a chance to route messages through secure channels.
As new systems like OnionBot gain popularity among the hacker commu-
nity, existing privacy-enhancing techniques will become evidently less secure,
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and new security infrastructure will need to be developed. Additional systems
similar to Tor will also need to be developed as Tor is already a high-value
target for hackers and intelligence agencies. Right now, only very few complete
alternatives to Tor exists.
At present, the technologies in use on modern networks, assuming a strong
and proper implementation, are still largely safe. However, the developments
of new malicious technologies with the potential to subvert existing network
security protocols should not be taken lightly. Threats breaking out on privacy
enhancing infrastructures can have a serious effect on society and mitigation
techniques need to continue evolving.
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